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Abstract
I outline the potential implications of sectoral factor immobility for the
debate on the e¤ects of low-wage competition on wage inequality in ad-
vanced countries. In theory, the presence of sector-specic factors serves
to damp the magnication e¤ect of World traded prices upon relative
wages, by reducing the shift of output from unskilled-intensive to skilled-
intensive sectors, and Edwards and Whalley (2007) have shown that only
modest amounts of xed factors are required to alter results qualitatively.
There is evidence among OECD countries of a negative relationship be-
tween the structural decline of manufacturing since 1970 and increasing
wage inequality: it is argued that the less exible labour market institu-
tions in Continental Europe may have mitigated the downward pressure
on unskilled wages by this route, particularly if factor depreciation is of
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an ongoing maintenance cost variety.
Keywords: Trade, inequality, globalisation, factor immobility
JEL classications: F16, F11, D51
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The aim of this paper is to outline the potential implications for the trade
and wages debate of factor immobility. In doing so, it is hoped to point the
way to future research on the role of factor specicity, in particular making use
of dynamic modelling techniques. Following Edwards and Whalley (2007), it is
argued that, unless factor specicity - in a wide sense - is investigated, a proper
understanding of the relationship between globalisation (in the form of a fall in
the price of imports of low-skilled manufactures) and increasing inequality in
the Western World cannot be reached. It is also suggested that recent advances
in the theories of rm heterogeneity (Ghironi and Melitz (2005)), searching and
matching (Rauch and Casella (2003), Edwards (2006)), as well as labour-market
matching theory and the implications of hiring and ring costs (Bentolila and
Bertola (1990)) can be interpreted in terms of rm-specic, industry-specic
and trade direction-specic factors, which may help explain the apparently slow
adjustment of many economies - particularly in Continental Europe - to trade
shocks.
0.1 Wage inequality trends
Wage di¤erentials sharply widened during the 1980s in two main economies:
Britain and the United States1 (see Table 1), although a number of other coun-
tries saw a more limited increase in di¤erentials.
1Of the smaller economies, Portugal also experienced a large increase in inequality.
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Country 1970s change 1980s change
Australia -16.6 0.6
Austria 4.8 6.1
Denmark -14.9 6.1
Finland -16.5 -1.3
Ireland NA 3.9
Japan NA 2.2
Portugal NA 14.5
Sweden 3.4 -3.1
United Kingdom -2.7 12.0
United States -2.5 7.6
Table 1: Changes in skill premia across ten countries (Source: Haskel and
Slaughter (2002)) from United Nations General Industrial Data Base.
A frequently-expressed view is that the di¤erent experiences of Anglo-Saxon
and Continental European economies in the 1980s reects greater labour market
rigidities. While there may be some validity in this (particularly bearing in
mind the persistently high unemployment in Continental Europe in the 1990s),
I suggest it is not valid to interpret the di¤erence between the two economies
(e.g. Davis (1996)) as being primarily one of a downwardly-rigid real wage for
unskilled workers. Rather, a simple data plot suggests that the more important
di¤erence may be that Continental European economies have seen less of a
restructuring of output away from manufacturing (which is unskilled-intensive)
towards services - had wage rigidity been the case, the reverse would have been
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Various OECD countries: change in inequality 1979-1989 related to change in
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the case. This is shown in Figure 1, below.This rather simple analysis suggests
that the di¤erences in manufacturing decline across di¤erent OECD countries
since 1970 play an important role in understanding the widely di¤erent income
distribution experiences in the 1980s - and that therefore a key issue is to nd
out why manufacturings decline has varied so widely.
1 Trade shocks in a factors-mobile world
The centrepiece of neoclassical trade theory, the Heckscher-Ohlin (henceforth
H-O) model and related Stolper-Samuelson theorem, rely upon the assumptions
that technology and tastes are invariant across countries, along with a raft of
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other assumptions2 , which ensure that the only cause for trade is the di¤erences
in relative factor endowments. Crucially, factors are also assumed to be fully
mobile between sectors within a country, but immobile across national bound-
aries. Trade - if there are no barriers - therefore takes the place of international
factor migration in serving to equalise factor returns across countries: countries
will export the goods which are intensive in those factors in which they are
relatively abundant.
1.1 General equilibrium of a non-specialised small, open
H-O economy: magnication
Traditional H-O theory only operates over a range of prices where no country
is completely specialised in one good (or, in a multi-factor case, in fewer goods
than it possesses factors). Consider the case of a single small, open economy
producing two goods, X and M , using two factors, U (unskilled labour) and
S (skilled labour). We assume constant returns to scale, diminishing technical
returns to substitution and perfect competition. A central result is the magni-
cation e¤ect, initially outlined by Jones, 1965. This states that a change in
relative traded goods prices will lead to a larger change in the ratio of factor
prices.
The setup of the economy is that factor input-output ratios ui; si; in
industry i (i  fX;Mg) are functions of factor wages Wu and Ws. I assume
2See a standard text, such as Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) for the full list of assumptions
of the H-O model.
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that there is no factor intensity reversal, and that industry X is always the more
intensive in S (sX=uX > s=uM ). The zero prot conditions are
Pi = uiWu + siWs; (1)
where Pi, the price of good i, is set exogenously on World markets. Factors
are fully mobile between sectors, but available in xed national endowments, so
factor wages serve to clear factor markets:
X
i
uifWu;WsgYi = U ; (2)X
i
sifWu;WsgYi = S:
Let us assume initially that all wages and prices are normalised at unity. Now
a trade shock causes the price of unskilled-intensive good M , PM , to fall, while
PX remains at 1. The magnication result is that, in the new equilibrium,
Wu < PM < PX < Ws, so that the relative change in factor prices is greater
than that in goods prices.
An intuitive explanation for this follows from the zero prot conditions in
(1). Since Wu weighs more heavily in the costs of good M than of good X,
now that PM has fallen, we would expect Wu to fall. A related explanation
is that the price shift causes producers to want to cut back on production of
good M and increase production of good X. However, this is not possible with
clearing markets, given the relative factor intensities of the two goods, unless
the skilled/unskilled ratio in each industry rises: this will only happen if Ws
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increases relative to Wu.But since the price of good X has not changed, it
follows from the zero prot condition that, if the price of one input has fallen,
then that of the other input, Ws, must have risen. Now looking at the zero
prot condition, it is clear that, for PM to have fallen while Ws has risen, Wu
must have fallen even more sharply.
To look at magnication in more depth: if we restrict ourselves to the case
of CES technology, then output of each industry, Yi, is given by
Yi = Ai(iU

i + (1  i)Si )1=; (3)
where Ai is a set of scale parameters for each industry, i is a set of unskilled
share parameters and  is a substitution parameter, where the elasticity of
substitution  = 1=(1   ): I am assuming the same substitution elasticity in
each industry, to rule out issues of factor-intensity reversal. I also assume M >
X ; so that the exporting industry is more skill-intensive than the importing
industry.
Assuming cost-minimisation, each rm will choose employment of each factor
to equate the value of marginal product to the factor wage. This can be shown
to imply
ui = Ui=Yi = (Aii)
1=1 (Pi=Wu)1=1 ; (4)
si = Si=Yi = (Ai(1  i))1=1 (Pi=Ws)1=1 ;
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Si=Ui = (i=(1  i))1=1 (Wu=Ws)1=1 : (5)
which conrms that  = 1=(1  ) is the elasticity of substitution. Henceforth,
I rewrite the equations in terms of :
We can simplify the analysis further by choosing units such that AE = AM =
1. Also, we can set PX at unity, allowing only PM to vary, and we can denote
Ws=Wu = :
Consequently, (4) can be rewritten as
ui = Ui=Yi = i
(Pi=Wu)
; (4a)
si = Si=Yi = (1  i)(Pi=Wu) :
The zero prot conditions imply
Wu(uX + sX) = 1;
Wu(uM + sM ) = PM :
W 1 u [X
 + 1 (1  X)] = 1; (6)
W 1 u [M
 + 1 (1  M )] = P 1 M ;
and dividing the equations in (6) and rearranging gives us
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[X
 + 1 (1  X)]P 1 M = [M + 1 (1  M )];
1 [(1  X)P 1 M   (1  M )] = M   XP 1 M ;
Z = 1  = (M
   XP 1 M )=[(1  X)P 1 M   (1  M )]: (7)
Equation (7) is generally known as a mandated wages equation.
Di¤erentiating (7) with respect to PM , we nd
dZ=dPM =  (1  )EP M =[(1  X)P 1 M   (1  M )]
 (1  )(1  X)P M (M   XP 1 M )
=[(1  X)P 1 M   (1  M )]2;
= (1  )ZP M [ (X=(M   XP 1 M ))
 (1  X)=((1  X)P 1 M   (1  M ))]:
So
d=dPM = (d=dZ)(dZ=dPM );
= Z1=(1 )P M [(X
=(X
P 1 M   M))
 (1  X)=((1  X)P 1 M   (1  M ))]: (8)
This is most easily evaluated at the point where PM = 1, in which case
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(d=dPM )(PM=) = d ln=d lnPM (9)
= [(X
=(X
   M))  (1  X)=((1  X)   (1  M ))]:
Since M > X ; d ln=d lnPM is negative. If initial factor intensities are
very close together (M   X ! 0), the elasticity will tend towards innity. As
 tends to zero, d ln=d lnPM tends to innity.
Implications of the mandated wages equation (7) are that:
 relative factor wages move disproportionately when goods prices change
(the magnication e¤ect).
 relative factor wages are insensitive to factor endowments.
 (it is not di¢ cult to show that) a change in the relative scale parameters,
Ai, acts in the same way as a change in prices, causing a switch in demand
towards the sector with growing Ai, and a rise in the relative price of the
factor in which it is intensive. This is sector-biased technical progress.
 a change in the share parameters, i - factor-biased technical progress -
will have ambiguous e¤ects on relative wages. If i changes by a similar
amount in both sectors, one might expect the e¤ect on relative wages to
be small. This e¤ect was pointed out by Haskel and Slaughter (2002) and
is contrary to the standard view that unskilled labour-saving technical
progress in Western economies has been primarily responsible for the
change in relative wages.3
3Though Krugman (2000) points out that technical progress, if it takes place across the
advanced World, may well a¤ect global prices and hence wages.
11
1.2 Complete specialisation
Relative factor wages will only conform to (7) as long as the economy continues
to produce as many goods as it has factors. However, as fall in PM will lead
to a shift in production towards good X; eventually a price level, P M , will be
reached at which the economy is entirely specialised in producing good X. P M
is the goods price ratio at which the ratio of employment of the two factors in
industry X, uX=sX , will equal the economy-wide ratio of factor endowments,
U=S. Adapting equation (5), we nd
S=U = (X=(1  X)) ;
 = ((1  X)=X)(U=S)1=: (5a)
But from (7),
1  = (M
   XP 1 M )=[(1  X)P 1 M   (1  M )];
= ((1  X)=X)1 (U=S)(1 )=;
((1 X)=X)1 (U=S)(1 )=[(1 X)P 1 M  (1 M )] = (M XP 1 M );
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P 1 M [(1  E)((1  E)=E)1 (U=S)(1 )= + E] = M
+(1  M )((1  X)=X)1 (U=S)(1 )=;
P 1 M [(1  X)(U=S)(1 )= + X ] = MX1 
+(1  M )(1  X)(U=S)(1 )=;
P M = f[MX1  + (1  M )(1  X)(U=S)(1 )=] (10)
=[(1  X)(U=S)(1 )= + X ]g1=(1 ):
Once the price has fallen below P M , further World price changes will have
no e¤ect on relative wages. On the other hand, wages will now be very sensitive
to changes in relative factor supplies, and to factor-biased technical progress
(changes in X).
2 The e¤ect of factor xity
As Mayer (1974), Mussa (1974) and Neary (1978) established, the introduction
of factor xity reduces both the degree of sectoral shift and the change in relative
wages in response to a trade price shock. A recent paper by Edwards and
Whalley (2007) showed that, on plausible substitution elasticity assumptions,
this e¤ect signicantly changes the World price-wages relationship even when
the degree of factor xity is small.
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Edwards and Whalley (2007) outline a number of number of forms of factor
xity:
2.1 The Ricardo-Viner three factor model
In a Ricardo-Viner model (Jones (1971), Samuelson (1971)) one factor, usually
capital, is sector-specic. Consequently, its price will vary across sectors and it
can, in e¤ect, be considered as a di¤erent factor in every sector in which it is
employed. Prices are still set on World markets, subject to perfect competition,
but in this case changes in the relative rental wages of the xed factor in each
sector mean that the zero prot conditions for the declining and expanding
industries and market clearing for the mobile factor can be satised with much
smaller changes in either sectoral output or the wage of the mobile factor.
Indeed, the Mussa (1974), Mayer (1974) and Neary (1978) papers established
a possibly counterintuitive result: the e¤ect in a two-good, two-factor model of
making one factor sectorally immobile (so it e¤ectively becomes two factors) is
to reduce the responsiveness of all factor prices (including the immobile factors)
to a change in World traded prices. This is because, if a factor cannot move, then
sectoral output will shift less than in a H-O model, and consequently there will
be less change in the relative demand for di¤erent factors. Extending Nearys
(1978) analysis, I show this rst diagrammatically, assuming that factor U is
sectorally immobile, while factor S is fully mobile within a country.
We are comparing three scenarios: A is the starting scenario. F represents
equilibrium after a fall in the price of good M , in the case where factor U (the
14
factor in which M is intensive) is sectorally immobile. V represents the long-
run case where all factors can move. We note rst that in the Edgeworth box
diagram (bottom left) points A and V lie on the contract curve, while F does
not. The curvature of the contract curve reects the di¤erence in relative factor
intensities of the two industries and the substitution elasticity. The shift from
A to V represents a redeployment of resources away from industry M .
The top left-hand diagram shows the equilibrium for the mobile factor S.
In each industry, value of marginal product of S will decline as employment
of S increases, though an increase in employment of U will shift the curve
upwards. Equilibrium occurs where value of marginal product in both industries
is equated: before the price change, this is at point A.
A fall in the price of good M will cause the VMP curve for S in industry M
to shift downwards. Consequently, this causes a fall in Ws, and a redeployment
of S away from industry M towards industry X; as shown at point F . The
corresponding equilibrium in the market for factor U (an addition to Nearys
(1978) exposition) is shown in the top right-hand quadrant. Point A represents
the economy in long-run equilibrium prior to the shock, soWu is equated across
the two sectors. The curves through A are obtained by inverting the initial
zero prot conditions for the two industries. I will call these relative wage
schedules. The schedule for the more S-intensive industry X has the steeper
gradient. A fall in the price of M causes the schedule for M to fall. Mapping
across the equilibrium wages for S from the top left-hand diagram enables us
to calculate the two equilibrium wages for U in the di¤erent sectors (marked by
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F ). By contrast, point V in the top right-hand diagram is where both relative
wage schedules intersect, as in the long-run mobility of U allows its wage to
be equated in both sectors. Note this involves moving up and leftwards from
point F , so that Us wage falls further in the long-run than in the short-run,
even in the declining industry. By contrast, the wage of factor S must rise, even
compared to the case A, because point V lies up and to the left of A along the
relative wage schedule for industry X, where the product price is unchanged.
In the top left-hand quadrant, the movement of U in the long-run shifts
the VMP curve for S in declining sector M downwards, while that in sector X
moves upwards, leading to a new equilibrium at V .
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It follows from this that skilled wages fall slightly in the short run, but
rise in the long run. Unskilled wages rise in the expanding sector and fall in
the declining sector in the short run, but fall in both sectors in the long run.
Ironically, factor U is better o¤ in both sectors if it is unable to move than if it
is fully mobile.
2.2 The four factor model
As a variant on the Ricardo-Viner three factor model, Edwards and Whalley
(2007) consider a four-factor model, with capital stocks in each sector xed in
the short run, while both types of labour are sectorally mobile in the short-
and long-run. As a simple way of developing this model, Edwards and Whalley
(2007) develop a nested production structure. First, the two forms of labour, S
and U , are combined to form aggregate labour using a CES form:
Li = Ai(iU

i + (1  i)Si )1=: (11)
Note the strong similarity to equation (3). The higher level of the production
function combines aggregate labour with sectorally immobile capital, by means
of a Cobb-Douglas aggregation:
Yi = BiK
i
i L
1 i
i ; (12)
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where i is capitals share in value added in each sector. Since Ki is xed in
the short-run, we can rewrite this as
Yi = CiL
1 i
i ; (12a)
where Ci is a constant. It follows that
WLi=Pi = @Yi=@Li = (1  i)CiL ii ;
@(WLi=Pi)=@Li =  i(WLi=Pi)=Li; (13)
which is negative. Consequently, if labour (skilled and unskilled) ows into an
expanding sector, X, then the aggregate labour wage in that sector, WLE , will
decline relative to the goods price PX ; while in the declining sector, M , the
aggregate labour wage WLM will not fall as fast as PM . But by analogy with
equation (7), the skilled-unskilled wage ratio will be a function of WLM=WLX :
1  = (M
 X(WLM=WLX)1 )=[(1 X)(WLM=WLX)1  (1 M )]:
(14)
Since the fall in WLM=WLX is less than the fall in PM , it follows that  will
change less when there is a xed factor. Moreover, from (13) we would expect
that, the higher the capital share in value added, i; the less sensitive relative
skilled and unskilled wages will be to changes in product prices.
To explain this more intuitively, the magnication e¤ect on the skilled/unskilled
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wage premium occurs because a switch in output from industry M to industry
X requires a rise in the skilled/unskilled labour ratios in both sectors, in order
to clear labour markets, given set labour endowments. However, the sectoral
shift of output will be damped because capital is immobile, so that capital rents
rise in the expanding sector, discouraging expansion.
Edwards and Whalley (2007) found in simulations for the United Kingdom,
assuming  = 1:25; that the e¤ects of a fall in World prices of unskilled-intensive
good M on the skilled/unskilled wage ratio were reduced by 1/3 if even 2% of
value added comprised payments to a xed factor, compared to a full mobility
model. With 5% xed factor, the relative wage change was less than half that
with a Heckscher-Ohlin model. With all capital immobile between sectors, the
e¤ect of World prices on wages is just 1/8 of that when all factors are fully
mobile.
It follows that short-run capital xity could play a very important role in
damping relative wage changes. Against this, however, it is worth noting that
capital depreciates over time: for example, Nadiri and Prucha (1997) estimated
that physical capital in US manufacturing depreciates at 5.9% per annum, while
the rate for R&D capital is 12%. This estimate is higher than those typically
used by National Accounts statisticians. A depreciation rate of 7% per annum
on average would reduce the capital stock, over 25 years, to just 16% of its initial
value (or perhaps just over 5% of value added). This might still be enough to
halve the impact of a World price change on relative wages, according to the
Edwards and Whalley (2007) simulations.
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2.3 Costs on Labour Mobility
Even when labour can, in theory, move between sectors, there may be costs
to doing so. These vary from the costs of moving house through to those of
a possible period of transitional unemployment. There are also the costs to
employers of hiring new workers.
In the short-run, if the expanding sector, X, can only attract new workers
by taking them from the declining sector, M , and if, for simplicity, we assume
the costs of this movement are borne by the workers moving, then a potential
wage gap can open up between the two sectors, of up to the cost of moving,  :
If  is constant for all workers, then there will be no movement between sectors
until the wage gap exceeds this threshold.4 This e¤ectively makes labour a
semi-specic factor.
There is evidence that unskilled labour is sectorally less mobile than skilled
labour. For example, Haynes et al (2000) found that those in the UK with lower
skills experience longer periods of unemployment when laid o¤. Greenaway et
al (2001) found a 7 3/4% average wage di¤erential in the UK between sectors
with expanding employment and those with declining employment. Assuming
this di¤erential were entirely explained by mobility costs on unskilled workers,
Edwards and Whalley (2007) suggest this would imply a 13.7 % maximum
wage di¤erential for the unskilled, before they would be prepared to move,
and simulations implied a di¤erential would reduce the e¤ects of a World price
4 In practice, we would probably expect  to be an increasing function of the number of
workers moving.
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change on the wage di¤erential by nearly half.
This position may be even more signicant when we look at Continental Eu-
rope, where ring costs of workers are generally regarded as higher. The OECD
generally only produces a country ranking on this: a 1994 ranking (repeated
in Nickell (1997)) suggests the USA has the lowest di¢ culty of ring, while
Italy is the highest, with France, Belgium and Germany close behind. The UK
was in seventh place, somewhere between the other Anglo-Saxon economies and
Continental Europe.
Unemployment benet replacement ratios are also higher in Continental Eu-
rope: however, the e¤ect on job mobility costs is likely to be ambiguous. On
the one hand, a rm may need to o¤er higher wages to attract new workers.
Against this, high benets cushion the e¤ects of transitional unemployment for
workers laid o¤.
Again, one would expect these labour mobility costs to be more of a short-
than a long-run phenomenon, given that we would expect that approximately
1/40 of the workforce retires each year and is replaced. However, there may be
lasting problems of regional mobility in some countries.
A di¤erence between the USA (in particular) and the UK (to a lesser ex-
tent) compared to Continental Europe has been faster growth of the number
of workers in employment in the past two decades. One might expect this to
make it easier for the expanding industry to hire workers, so reducing the role
of intersectoral immobility in the Anglo-Saxon countries.
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3 Factor Specicity in a Dynamic Context: the
nature of depreciation
While estimated depreciation and turnover rates may give some indication of the
decline of sector-specic factor endowments over time, these have to be taken
with a good deal of care. This is because there are a number of di¤erent models
of depreciation. Following Edwards (2006a), I focus here on two particular
models of depreciation, which could be considered polar opposites: the constant
probability of death model and the constant annual maintenance cost model.
With the constant probability of death model, a depreciation rate of, say, 6
per cent per annum means that there is a 6 % chance in any one year that the
capital stock of any rm will need total replacement. One might expect that,
after a negative trade shock, a rm whose capital expires will shut, up to the
point where the industry is in a new equilibrium. There will therefore be a slow
adjustment over time in the capital stock of the declining industry, until the
industry has shrunk to its new equilibrium level. This might well suggest that
a fairly crude dynamic model of industry capital stock in year t would work
acceptably:
Kit = max((1  )Kit   1;Kit); (15)
where Kit represents the long-run equilibrium level. Investment would be zero
until the capital stock has fallen to Kit.
However, if depreciation takes the alternative form, with a constant annual
maintenance cost of %; then the analysis is quite di¤erent. In this case, the
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only avoidable cost, if the rm decides to scrap its existing capital stock and
shut capacity, is the maintenance cost. The interest cost on existing capital
outlays is not recuperable. Consequently, if the industry had been earning
normal prots (at rate r%) prior to the trade shock, then returns on capital
need to fall to proportion r=(r + ) of normal returns before capacity will be
scrapped. This is very akin to the semi-xed model of labour discussed in section
2.3, in the case where there are costs on labour mobility: in this case the cost
is on capital mobility, and consequently an industry has 3 potential states (see
Edwards and Whalley (2007)): expanding, static (where its returns on capital
are less than normal, but not su¢ cient to encourage scrapping) and declining.
Where depreciation is purely of the ongoing maintenance cost variety, a declining
industry is likely to undergo a rapid shake-out of capacity, until returns on the
remaining capacity return to the threshold level above which capacity will not
be scrapped.
There may, of course, be a hybrid model, in which total depreciation, ;
consists partly of the constant annual probability of death (1) and partly of
the ongoing maintenance cost variety (2). The dynamics of the shake-out in
this kind of industry require more analysis.
3.1 Labour turnover
In some respects, the turnover of labour is potentially even more complicated
than that of capital. Labour may move out of a rm, and yet stay within
the same industry, profession or region. Hence, crude labour turnover rates
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may be quite misleading when estimating the dynamics of labour movement
into and out of a sector. Moreover, as with the issue of depreciation rates,
there may be di¢ culties in a rm simply not replacing sta¤ when they are
retired or leave due to natural wastage. This is because job denitions and
complementarities may make it di¢ cult to leave a particular post unlled, while
maintaining the productivity of those around. This could potentially turn labour
turnover into something more akin to the ongoing maintenance cost form of
capital depreciation: unless there is to be a major (and costly) restructuring of
the rms employment, posts may have to be lled even after a sector has been
adversely a¤ected by a trade shock.
3.2 Labour and Capital Complementarities
There may be important interactions between decisions on capital capacity re-
duction and labour force reduction, in particular if the conditions in the sections
above hold. In other words, it may be di¢ cult just to stop replacing capital, if
that involves costly lay-o¤ decisions for workers, and likewise it may be expen-
sive to cease hiring replacement workers, if capital is in part a sunken cost, and
failing to hire workers means scrapping capacity.
For these reasons, it is quite conceivable that sector-specicity of factors
may be a long-standing issue, not simply a transitional one which gradually
fades away in the face of depreciation following a trade shock. These issues
need dynamic modelling - yet the modelling has to be done carefully, and may
need to take account of a variety of di¤erent depreciation and labour turnover
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assumptions. In particular, some depreciation and turnover specications may
imply threshold e¤ects, so that a relatively small di¤erence in policy on, say,
ring costs or regional subsidies or taxation, may be enough to cause a quite
signicant di¤erence between countries in terms of response to a trade shock.
This may well be a key factor in understanding the very di¤erent dynamic
responses in both sectoral output/employment patterns fand in wage inequality
between the UK and Continental Europe.
4 Unaccounted forms of Capital
In this section, I argue that standard trade models may be underestimating the
capital stocks (broadly-dened) involved in production and trade. In particu-
lar, much of the current literature on heterogeneous rms or on searching and
matching in trade can be interpreted in terms of either entrepreneurial or infor-
mational capital. I argue these phenomena e¤ectively introduce new forms of
specic factors into the trade-wages equation: with the e¤ect of further damping
sectoral shift and wage magnication following a trade shock.
4.1 Entrepreneurial capital
A number of recent papers have introduced the idea of rm heterogeneity into
the analysis of trade.5 Firms vary in e¢ ciency, at least in part, in a random way.
However, when looking at the economy as a whole, over a period of time, rm
5See Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Bernard et al (2005), Edwards (2006a).
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e¢ ciency can be interpreted as a form of entrepreneurial capital: rms enter
the market on a trial basis, with most never making a prot and eventually
shutting. However, the probability that some of the rms entering will turn
out to be highly e¢ cient (and protable) is what keeps new rms entering.
In equilibrium, one would expect that the long-run expected returns on the
survivor rms (after adjusting for risk) compared with the losses on failures
would set the expected return on a new entrant equal to the normal return on
capital. However, when looking at individual rms, the e¢ cient (survivor) rms
will be earning supranormal prots. Now, when faced with an adverse shift in
traded prices for their output, many of the intramarginal, e¢ cient rms may
still be protable and remain open, so reducing the degree to which output will
fall in response to a price change.
4.2 Informational capital
Informational capital includes the returns spent on advertising, branding and
signalling expenditure, all of which will allow some well-known brands to con-
tinue producing in a given location long after it ceases to have comparative
advantage for a new entrant in that industry. However, it is worth noting that
production of a well-known brand can often shift abroad over time. Against
this, countries themselves can develop a reputation - to the extent that, say,
BMW cars are reputable because they are associated with German engineer-
ing, production may not be very internationally mobile in response to shifts in
comparative production costs.
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We should also note that much trade is of the form of inter-rm trade and
outsourcing, where inter-rm relationships are crucial. Firms in good matches
with foreign partners may well survive an adverse shift in the terms of trade,
damping the trade-wages relationship (Rauch and Casella, 2003). Besedes and
Prusa (2006) and Edwards (2006b) suggest that these di¤erences in match qual-
ity are actually indicative of a long-run search process for trading partners:
Edwards (2006b) in particular suggests that match quality is a form of infor-
mational capital, and that, on a fairly rough formulation, the returns on infor-
mational capital could account in equilibrium for around 10% of the value of
inter-rm trade.
4.3 Industry Specic Public Goods
Certain public goods or infrastructure investments may specically support pro-
duction of a particular good in a particular country or region: for example, the
veterinary services which underpin livestock production, or the construction and
provision of dedicated railway lines linking a coal mine or a port to a steelworks.
Again, these should be counted as sector-specic capital.
5 Capital Formation E¤ects
A trade shock can also potentially cause substantial macroeconomic changes,
with potential labour market implications, through its e¤ects on capital forma-
tion. This is the case even where capital is immobile between countries, so long
as a change in the return on investments leads to a change in aggregate capital
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formation. However, these days, it may well be sensible to see new capital as
being relatively mobile internationally, tending to equate capital returns across
the advanced countries (at least).
In these circumstances, a shift in a countrys terms of trade can potentially
result in a large change in aggregate investment volumes, particularly in the
case where there are either sector-specic factors present or where there are
heterogeneous rms (which, as I have argued, can be interpreted as a form of
sector-specic capital). This is because high levels of capital (or entrepreneurial
capital) from past investments may remain for a long time in a sector in which a
country formerly had a comparative advantage, but which is now declining, yet
at the same time there will no longer be demand for any new capacity-increasing
investments in that sector. At the same time, the slowness of output in the
decliningsector actually to decline maintains demand for labour, so keeping
wages above the level at which investment in the newer fexpanding sector
becomes economic. The country therefore goes through a prolonged phase in
which, although its existing rms may remain competitive, new rms are not
competitive in either sector.
While this analysis may be most appropriate to a heterogeneous rms model,
I suggest it is most easily illustrated in the context of a traditional, two-factor
model, with labour and capital employed by two industries using Cobb-Douglas
technology:
Yi = K
i
i L
1 i
i ; i  fX;Mg: (16)
Now, assume Km is xed at Km. Consequently, if the labour wage is W , and
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the price of good i is Pi, then the demand for labour in the declining sector
Lmm = (1  m)K
m
m Pm=W: (17)
I will assume in this simple example that, prior to the trade shock, sector X is
not competitive and does not produce. Therefore, in the pre-shock situation, if
we assume Pm0 = 1, then
W0 = (1  m)Kmm =L
m
; (18)
where L is the xed national labour endowment. The return on capital in the
pre-shock situation is given by
R0 = mK
m 1
m L
1 m
= R; (19)
which is the global rate of return on new investment. Now, as Pm falls following
the trade shock, W and the return on capital in sector m; RM will fall propor-
tionately. However, assuming the price of good X is also unity, there will be no
new investment in industry E until the wage falls to a critical level, W , which
can be derived from the zero prot condition for industry X
1 = PX = (R
=X)X (W =(1  X))(1 X);
W  = (1  X)(R=X)X=(X 1): (20)
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However, wages may never fall to this level, if the capital stock in sector M
depreciates on an ongoing maintenance cost basis, and if Pm stays high enough
that Rm does not fall below r=(r+ ) times R0. The economy may continue to
show high rates of capital formation, but this is mostly replacement investment.
A similar model can be derived where the sectorally-xed capital stock is
mostly informational or entrepreneurial capital. In this case, new investment
(in the form of new rm start-ups and experimental matching) in sector M
may stop or slow considerably following the trade shock. but physical capital
formation and employment in this sector may remain high. Costs on labour
mobility may, in theory, have similar e¤ects as well.
6 Avenues for further enquiry
The ideas in this paper require exploration, particularly in the form of simu-
lation modelling across various countries using a variety of parameters. The
intention would be to nd plausible ranges for the magnication e¤ect of a
trade shock in countries with di¤erent initial capitalisation of rms or di¤erent
labour market institutions - looking both at comparative static and dynamic
models. An interesting question is the degree to which stickylabour markets
in Continental Europe have actually served to damp the decline in unskilled
labour demand there, compared to the Anglo-Saxon economies. The e¤ects of
di¤erences in skills training policy and labour migration rates across countries
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may also play a part in specic factors models (since factor price insensitivity6
assumes full intersectoral factor mobility), and need investigation.
Further, the analysis above has assumed wages clear labour markets. The
interaction of specic factors models with bargaining theory of labour markets
may be a fruitful analysis, since, in economies with large amounts of sector-
specic factors, trades unions may potentially be able to bargain for higher
wages, e¤ectively sharing the xed factor rents, though at a cost in terms of
higher unemployment.
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